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Abstract
International investment agreements allow investors to bring compensation claims when their
investments are hurt by new regulations. This requirement that host governments compensate for
indirect expropriation helps solve post-investment moral hazard problems such as hold-ups,
thereby helping to prevent inefficient over-regulation and encouraging foreign investment.
However, when the social or environmental harm of a project is uncertain pre-investment,
compensation requirements can interact with National Treatment clauses in a manner that reduces
host government welfare and makes them less likely to admit investment. A police powers carve-
out from the definition of compensable expropriation can be Pareto-improving and increase
foreign investment.
KEYWORDS: foreign direct investment, regulatory takings, expropriation, international
investment agreements, National Treatment, environment
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1 Introduction
There are thousands of international investment agreements (IIAs) currently in force
around the world, including Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and investment
chapters in trade agreements (such as Chapter 11 of NAFTA, the North America
Free Trade Agreement). With very few exceptions IIAs have at least one lower
or middle income country signatory. IIAs seek to promote foreign direct invest-
ment by offering foreign investors increased security and transparency. One of
the most contentious features of modern IIAs is that they require that hosts com-
pensate investors in the event of expropriation or (possibly) regulatory actions that
diminish the value of the investment1. Arguably the most controversial feature of
the treaties are the investor-state dispute settle mechanisms which allow foreign
investors to bring treaty-based claims against the host country to an international
tribunal, bypassing the host’s domestic courts. Thus an international tribunal may
decide whether the host’s action constitutes an “expropriation”, requiring compen-
sation, or whether it falls within the host’s “police powers carve-out” for policies
designed to protect the public good, and is therefore not compensatory.2
The efficiency argument against a police powers carve-out from the defini-
tion of expropriation is based on moral hazard problems for the host regulator. In
many cases, the need for regulation is known only after the investment is sunk. If
the host may gain value from expropriating the investment — aside from the value
of avoided social harm — then the fact that the host makes the regulatory decision
creates a potential hold-up problem. Furthermore, lack of regard for the investor’s
welfare may lead to inefficient over-regulation by the host even in the absence of a
hold-up motivation. There is a significant literature on these so-called “regulatory
takings” following the seminal paper by Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984).
Contingent contracts or lump sum transfers that are made before the invest-
ment is undertaken could in principle offset the host’s “regulatory risk” (defined as
the risk of bearing the costs caused by regulation). For example, if the host can
make the right to invest conditional on a side-payment from the investor, then the
1Government regulatory actions which are claimed to require compensation are variously re-
ferred to in the literature as “regulatory takings”, “indirect expropriation”, or “creeping expropria-
tion”. This paper will generally use the term “indirect expropriation” except when discussing the
“regulatory takings” literature.
2In practice, before awarding compensation to an investor the Tribunal will need to consider at
least three questions, namely: whether the IIA conferred the property right which the investor claims
has been violated; whether the actions of the host did constitute a violation of that property right; and
whether or not the violation was a legitimate use of the host’s police powers. This paper presumes
the IIA does indeed confer property rights to investors, and focuses on the third consideration: it
examines the implications of different ’‘standards of proof” of the existence of social harm caused
by the investment that the host must meet.
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host can assure itself non-negative expected value from any project that it accepts.
However, practical difficulties limit the use of contingent contracts, and treaty pro-
visions that promote non-discrimination—particularly the National Treatment and
Most Favored Nation (MFN) clauses—restrict the feasibility of lump sum transfers.
Thus, a weak police powers carve-out may lead to an allocation of risk that affects
both the distribution of the rents and the efficiency of foreign investments.
The National Treatment clause requires that foreign investors receive at least
as good treatment as domestic investors “in like circumstances”; the MFN clause
similarly guarantees investors treatment at least as good as that received by investors
from any other foreign country. The international tribunal decides whether the for-
eign and domestic firms are indeed in like circumstances. The treaties’ investor-to-
state provision and the use of international tribunals create an asymmetry between
domestic and foreign investors, causing their circumstances to be inherently “un-
like”. Thus, there is a tension between the expropriation and the non-discrimination
clauses. Individually, each of these clauses helps to solve a moral hazard problem,
but collectively they might lead to inefficiencies.3 The requirement of National
Treatment and MFN makes it difficult for the host to impose stricter requirements
on foreign investors in order to offset the increased risk created by the expropria-
tion clause. Thus, the non-discrimination clauses create an efficiency argument for
courts to adopt a narrow interpretation of expropriation, i.e. permit a strong police
powers carve-out.
Expropriation clauses appear in almost all of the more than 2600 BITs and
modern plurilateral investment treaties, including NAFTA, the Central American -
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and the draft Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). The widespread use of expropriation clauses
is controversial, not least because of the early experience with NAFTA. Interpreting
“expropriation” broadly, investors have sued NAFTA governments for actions such
as banning a polluting petrol additive (Methanex v. U.S.) and refusing to permit
a hazardous waste facility (Metalclad v. Mexico). These lawsuits have prompted
some critics to claim that Chapter 11 benefits multinational corporations at the ex-
pense of states’ sovereign rights, the environment, and the public good; see Public
Citizen and Mann (2001). Other investment agreements have been used to bring
cases against environmental-policy actions of the governments of Bulgaria, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela (Tienhaara,
2008, 2009, forthcoming).
3Several recent papers, including Bagwell and Staiger (2001a), Bagwell and Staiger (2001b),
and Ederington (2001) analyze the role of National Treatment clauses in the GATT/WTO. Those
papers, like ours, are concerned with the interplay of different parts of an agreement. However,
those papers involve international trade rather than investment, and their results are driven by a
terms-of-trade effect, which has no role in our analysis.
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The decisions offered by the tribunals adjudicating these investment agree-
ment cases have not cleared the controversy. In Metalclad v. Mexico, the tribunal
found expropriation to have occurred even though there was no “obvious benefit [to]
the host state” (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2000).
Turk (2005) concludes that “[c]ompensation is required when a government actor
deprives a foreign investor of his fundamental ownership rights..., regardless of the
means, or reasons for the expropriation.” Conversely, Methanex v. U.S. tribunal de-
clared governments exempt from paying compensation for bona fide regulations for
the public good. Gaines (2002) and Soloway (2002), writing well before this ruling,
state that most tribunals acknowledge an implicit police powers carve-out from the
definition of expropriation, freeing states from the obligation to compensate foreign
investors for injury arising from non-discriminatory regulation for the public good.
The ongoing debate about the interpretation of expropriation clauses has produced
a sizable legal literature on the topic.
In one of the few formal economic analyses of the compensation in inter-
national investment agreements, Aisbett, Karp, and McAusland (2010) design an
optimal mechanism for determining compensation in cases of alleged indirect ex-
propriation under international investment agreements. In the current paper, we
conduct our analysis in a second-best setting which reflects current design and in-
terpretation of international investment agreements.4 We assess the efficiency, eq-
uity, and investment promotion impacts of a police powers carve-out, as well as
how these impacts depend on national treatment clauses and rights of establish-
ment in IIAs. Since many of the indirect expropriation cases under IIAs to date
involve environmental regulations, our model uses an environmental setting; how-
ever the tension between expropriation and non-discrimination clauses arises for a
variety of regulatory problems. Similarly, even though our modeling choices are
guided by characteristics of the legal environment created by NAFTA, our results
are applicable to the many thousands of similar bilateral and multilateral investment
agreements containing expropriation and non-discrimination clauses.
The rest of this Introduction discusses the role of expropriation clauses and
their relation to other parts of investment agreements. We also review relevant
literature. Section 2 of the paper discusses specific cases that have come before
NAFTA tribunals as well as details of investment agreements; this information val-
idates the two-period model introduced in Section 3. That section examines the
equilibrium level of regulation occurring post-investment. Section 4 studies the in-
vestment stage, where we assess the efficiency and equity of a weak versus strong
police powers carve-out. Section 5 concludes.
4The current paper also differs from Aisbett et al. (2010) in that it includes a direct expropriatory
(traditional hold-up problem) motivation for host regulation.
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Expropriation clauses help a host to make a credible commitment not to ex-
propriate foreign investors’ sunk assets, thereby helping to solve the hold-up prob-
lem. Grossman and Hart (1986) provide one of the first models of the hold-up
problem; recent contributions include Noldeke and Schmidt (1995) and Schmitz
(2001). Markusen (2001) discusses the costs and benefits, for developing countries
seeking to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), of the credible commitment that
expropriation clauses help create.
Advocates argue in favor of using investment treaties to protect investors’
rights on the assumption that these treaties promote FDI. An emerging body of em-
pirical literature, including Aisbett (2009), Hallward-Driemeier (2009), Neumayer
and Spess (2005), and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2004), finds little conclusive ev-
idence that BITs do promote FDI. Huang (2005) provides mixed evidence concern-
ing foreign firms’ need for international protection. Compared to average domestic
firms, foreign firms report lower levels of regulatory constraint, but foreign firms
may be treated less well than politically connected domestic firms.
Even a host that does not have a predatory incentive to expropriate the for-
eign investor may impose excessively strict regulations, simply because the cost
of the regulations is external to the host. Reviewing the literature on Pollution
Havens, Wilson (1997) labels a host’s failure to internalize the cost that local reg-
ulation imposes on inward FDI as a NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) outcome; see
also Levinson (1997). From the investor’s perspective, zealous regulation can be
viewed as creeping expropriation or a regulatory taking. Expropriation clauses that
force governments to compensate investors for costs arising from regulation can in-
duce hosts to internalize costs, thereby eliminating excess regulation and promoting
investment. Cost-internalization is the leading justification among legal scholars for
the U.S. Fifth Amendment, which states that private property shall not be “taken for
public purpose without just compensation” (Been and Beauvais, 2003).
The extent of protection that the Fifth Amendment provides property owners
is a matter of debate, but thus far U.S. courts have rejected the doctrine of regulatory
takings5. Some Chapter 11 plaintiff arguments (a few of which are summarized in
the next section) appear to construe NAFTA as an endorsement of the doctrine of
regulatory takings for international investments. These plaintiff arguments have
prompted public complaints that the expropriation clause amounts to an end-run
around U.S. and other nations’ domestic law. Some observers believe regulatory
takings claims such as Methanex v. U.S. are an unintended consequence of the
expropriation clause. Daniel Price, the lead U.S. Chapter 11 negotiator, rejects
this view, stating “The parties did not stumble into this [interpretation]....This was a
carefully crafted definition” (quoted from Greider, 2001; see also Price, 2000). The
5A term often associated with Epstein (1985)
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legal community is still debating whether the NAFTA case history validates fears
that NAFTA establishes a regulatory takings doctrine; see Tschen (1999), Soloway
(2002), Gaines (2002), Alvarez and Park (2003), and Turk (2005).
The main argument in favor of a weak or non-existent police powers carve-
out is that it promotes investment. However, guaranteed compensation may lead
to excessive investment. Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro point out that court accep-
tance of the doctrine of regulatory taking provides investors free insurance against
the loss induced by condemnation, thereby possibly leading to excessive invest-
ment. If international tribunals accept the doctrine of regulatory taking and rarely
accept the police powers defense, while domestic courts continue to reject the doc-
trine of regulatory taking, foreign firms implicitly receive subsidized insurance that
is denied to domestic investors.
We show that a weak police powers carve-out may also hinder investment.6
A weak police powers carve-out transfers regulatory risk to the host, reducing the
host’s expected payoff from investment. If the carve-out is very weak, the host’s
expected payoff may be negative and the host will want to reject some projects out-
right. Most investment treaties contain only weak rights of establishment, allowing
the host to reject undesirable projects (Vandevelde, 1998). Under these treaties, a
weak carve-out may compel the host to prohibit investment in risky sectors, even
though the investment may increase global welfare.
Some agreements like NAFTA, though, guarantee stronger rights to invest.
We show that under a weak police powers carve-out, agreements with strong rights
to invest may cause a host to receive more foreign investment, but benefit less. Fur-
thermore, in the spirit of Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro, we observe that some of
the investment created may even be inefficient from a global perspective. For invest-
ment agreements with strong pre-investment rights, a clearer carve-out can increase
the host’s expected benefit from FDI, and may be desirable on distributional as well
as efficiency grounds.
2 Background and institutional context
This section provides detail about NAFTA’s expropriation clause, some NAFTA
investor-to-state cases, and NAFTA features that might limit efficient first-stage
6In our model the existence of a police powers carve-out means that compensation is not required
for any losses arising from state actions which eliminate a social harm (e.g. regulation which shuts
down a polluting factory). The burden of proof of the existence of the social harm lies with the
host state (which is assumed to have private knowledge of the probability that harm has occurred).
Whether the carve-out is weak or strong depends on the standard of proof required of the host. If
the host must posses very good evidence of the existence of harm in order to be exempt from paying
compensation, we say the police powers carve-out is “weak”.
5
Aisbett et al.: Compensation in International Investment Agreements
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
bargaining between hosts and investors. Although NAFTA is just one of thousands
of IIAs, focusing on one allows us to be more specific in our statements. The
generality of our analysis, however, remains as most modern IIAs have features
very similar to NAFTA’s.
2.1 Expropriation and Chapter 11
NAFTA’s Article 1110 governs expropriation and compensation. This article states:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate
an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take
a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment (“expropriation”), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1) [fair
and equitable treatment]; and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2
through 6 [detailing the size and currency of compensation payments].
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of
the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took
place (“date of expropriation”), and shall not reflect any change in value
occurring because the intended expropriation had become known ear-
lier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value
including declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as
appropriate, to determine fair market value.
This article appears to state that even if the host’s actions are for a public purpose,
non-discriminatory, and in accordance with due process, they are still subject to
compensation requirements.
To date 27 publicly reported compensation claims have been filed under this
clause. These claims are arbitrated by either the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Below we describe three of these claims, focusing on
those features that guide our modeling choices in Section 3.
2.2 Non-discrimination rules
Like many other investment agreements, Chapter 11 specifies minimum treatment
standards, areas in which this treatment must be afforded, and exceptions to the
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treatment standards. NAFTA’s National Treatment standard is more comprehensive
than most BITs. Article 1102: National Treatment states
Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no
less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own in-
vestors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, man-
agement, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of invest-
ments.
The second paragraph is identical, with the phrase “to investors” replaced by “to
investments of investors”. Article 1103: Most-Favored-Nation Treatment is identi-
cal to the first two paragraphs of Article 1102 with the phrase “to its own investors”
replaced by the phrase “to investors of any other Party or of a non-Party”.
Articles 1102 and 1103 state that the host’s equitable treatment obligations
begin even before ground is broken for a new project, since the non-discrimination
rules apply during establishment and acquisition. Thus, the rules prevent the host
nation from demanding that foreigners pay up-front transfers in order to secure the
right to invest.
Annexes I and II of NAFTA allow governments to select sectors in which
they reserve the right not to provide National Treatment or MFN Treatment. All
three NAFTA signatories took advantage of these clauses, exempting industries
such as atomic energy, the extraction, transport or processing of petroleum, gas,
uranium and certain other minerals, aviation, shipping transport, trucking, telecom-
munications, media ownership, social services provision (e.g. law enforcement and
correctional services), legal services, minority affairs, education, and fisheries.
2.3 Case summaries
Although claims by investors under the rights conferred by IIAs were rare at first,
there has been a rapid increase in the number of claims in the last couple of years.
As of mid-2010 a total of 337 investor claims brought using bilateral investment
treaties or NAFTA’s Chapter 11 had been publicly registered.7 Of the registered
claims, 58 had been awarded in favor of the investor, 75 in favor of the host, 63
settled, and the majority of the remainder are pending. The cost of using formal
arbitration means that the vast bulk of claims are settled before they reach such a
stage. The cases described below are some of the earliest relating to environmental
regulation which were brought to arbitration. All of them arose under NAFTA.
7Source: data collected from arbitration venues by Lauge Skovgaard. Of the 337, 45 were
brought under NAFTA.
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Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (see Canada Department of Foreign Af-
fairs, 2004, Environment Canada, 1998, Warner, 2005, Global Lead Network, 2005)
Ethyl Corporation claimed that the Canadian federal government’s ban on imports
and interprovincial transport of the gasoline additive MMT violated NAFTA articles
1102 - National Treatment, 1106 - Performance Requirements, and 1110 - Expro-
priation and Compensation. Ethyl emphasized that the ban would benefit producers
of competing oxygenates (ethanol and MTBE), and that it was possible for MMT
to be used throughout Canada if manufacturing plants were established in each
province. On this basis Ethyl claimed that the ban was arbitrary and intentionally
discriminatory toward Ethyl, which was the sole supplier of MMT in Canada.
The Canadian government claimed that the ban was motivated by health
risks associated with manganese emissions as well as air quality concerns due to
damage MMT might cause to the catalytic converters in cars. Canada also noted
that MMT use in unleaded petrol was banned in much of the U.S. as well as in
parts of Europe. (The U.S. EPA initially banned the sale of MMT but was forced
to allow it by a domestic court ruling.) Canada’s ban of import and transport of
MMT, rather than use, weakened the government’s position. Allegedly, Canada’s
own laws prevented it from banning MMT use because the responsible government
agencies had found insufficient evidence of either the claimed environmental or
health effects.
Ethyl submitted a claim for US$251 million to an UNCITRAL panel. An-
ticipating that the panel was likely to find against it, in July 1998 the Canadian
government reversed the ban on MMT import and transport, paid Ethyl US$13 mil-
lion in legal fees and damages, and signed a letter stating that MMT is not known
to be hazardous and does not impair motor vehicle function.
Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (see U.S Department of
State, 2005, British Columbia Supreme Court, 2002) The Metalclad Corporation, a
U.S. waste disposal company, claimed that Mexico breached NAFTA articles relat-
ing to expropriation and standards of treatment. It asserted that a municipal gov-
ernment in Mexico wrongfully refused to permit Metalclad’s subsidiary to open
and operate a hazardous waste facility that Metalclad had built. Metalclad claimed
the project was built in response to the invitation of Mexican officials and that the
project met all Mexican legal requirements. Metalclad further claimed that an eco-
logical decree, made by the State government after Metalclad filed its initial claim
against Mexico, constituted expropriation. The ecological decree made the area
containing the landfill a preserve for cacti, preventing the landfill from ever being
able to operate. Metalclad sought damages of US$43,125,000 “plus damages for
the value of the enterprise taken”.
In August 2000, the ICSID tribunal concluded that the Mexican govern-
ment’s actions constituted expropriation and awarded Metalclad $16.7 million. Dis-
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cussing acts that constitute expropriation, in its statement of award, the tribunal
writes “[t]hus, expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and
acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory
transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental interfer-
ence with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole
or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State” (Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2000, para. 103). Although
the British Columbia Supreme Court later set aside part of the award, it upheld the
NAFTA tribunal’s finding that the State government’s ecological decree constituted
an indirect expropriation.
The $16.7 million award reflected Metalclad’s assessment of its costs for
developing the landfill, not the value of the operation. This award amount appears
inconsistent with language in NAFTA article 1110, paragraph 2, which states that
compensation shall include asset value (which incorporates the present value of
the stream of expected future profits). Another notable feature of the Metalclad
case is that the Mexican government was held liable for the actions of its political
subdivisions: the municipal agency charged with granting use permits and the State
governor who declared the ecological decree.
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America (see U.S. Depart-
ment of State, 2005, UNCITRAL Tribunal Methanex Corp. v. United States of
America, 2005) Methanex Corporation, a Canadian marketer and distributor of
methanol, alleged injuries resulting from a California ban on the use or sale in
California of the gasoline additive MTBE, which uses methanol as an ingredient.
Methanex contended that a California Executive Order and regulations banning
MTBE expropriated parts of its investments in the United States in violation of
Article 1110, denied it fair and equitable treatment in accordance with international
law in violation of Article 1105, and denied it National Treatment in violation of
Article 1102. California claimed that the ban on MTBE was enacted in order to
protect public health and prevent water pollution. Methanex asserted that the Cali-
fornian action resulted from political lobbying by the U.S. domestic ethanol indus-
try, a competitor in the gasoline additive market. Methanex also contended that the
regulations were not justified on environmental grounds and that there existed less
drastic means of addressing the environmental issues.
Methanex claimed damages of $970 million. On August 3, 2005, the Tri-
bunal issued a Final Award dismissing all of Methanex’s claims. The Tribunal
dismissed the expropriation claim on the grounds that the MTBE ban was the re-
sult of due process and for the public good: “...as a matter of general international
law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in ac-
cordance with due process and, which affects, inter alia, a foreign investor or in-
9
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vestment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable...” (UNCITRAL Tribunal,
p. 278). This language indicates that a police powers carve-out is consistent with
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, at least in the eyes of this particular tribunal.8 The Tribunal
also ordered Methanex to pay the United States’ legal fees and arbitral expenses of
approximately $4 million.
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America (see U.S Department of
State , 2005, Glamis Gold Ltd., 2003, United States of America, 2005) Glamis Gold
Ltd., a publicly-held Canadian corporation engaged in the mining of precious met-
als, submitted a claim to arbitration for alleged injuries relating to a proposed gold
mine in Imperial County, California. Glamis claims that it invested approximately
$15 million in gold mining operations, including the purchase of mining claims for
its Imperial County mining project. It asserts that $13 of the $15 million was spent
after receiving initially favorable signals from various regulatory bodies. It further
claims that certain federal government actions and California measures with re-
spect to open-pit mining operations resulted in the expropriation of its investments
in violation of Article 1110, and denied its investments the minimum standard of
treatment under international law in violation of Article 1105. The California mea-
sures include regulations requiring backfilling and grading for mining operations
in the vicinity of Native American sacred sites. The regulations are general and
not specific to Glamis’s operations. Nonetheless, seeking to respond to growing
public opposition to the Glamis Imperial project, then Governor Grey Davis explic-
itly stated that the regulations would essentially stop the project. Glamis claimed
damages of not less than $50 million, which it stated are below the projected value
of the investment. The U.S. defense claimed that even without the actions of the
Californian government, the project was uneconomic.
On June 8, 2009, the Tribunal released the Award, dismissing Glamis’s
claim in its entirety and ordering Glamis to pay two-thirds of the arbitration costs
in the case.
3 The model
We develop a two-stage model of environmental regulation and investment in the
presence of a pre-existing international investment agreement (IIA). In the first
stage the host and the investor determine the size of T , the tax payment the source
will make to the host conditional on the host doing nothing later that decreases the
8The UNCITRAL panel’s ruling need not, however, create a precedent by which all future expro-
priation claims will be judged. The practice of Stare Decisis (letting precedent determine future legal
rulings), is not followed in international law to the same extent as in the courts of some countries,
notably the United Sates (Bhala, 1999, Chua, 1998).
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value of the project for the investor. The parties take as given the terms of the IIA,
including the size of any police powers carve-out, and any other investment clauses
such as National Treatment. The host’s ability to reject a project may be constrained
by a right to establishment requirement in the treaty.
The project might result in environmental damages of fixed magnitude H, a
measure of a project’s riskiness. In the first stage, the host and the investor have
identical information concerning the probability distribution for this random event,
and both agents are risk neutral. In the second stage the host obtains information
about the probability of environmental harm; this information is not verifiable by
the court.9 The host has three choices: (a) do not regulate, and suffer the possible
environmental harm; (b) regulate, thereby avoiding the environmental harm, and re-
imburse the investor for the amount of the investment; or (c) regulate (avoiding the
possible harm) and claim the police powers justification. The third action triggers
an investor complaint to the international tribunal. Defending against this com-
plaint is always costly to the host. We assume that if the host loses the litigation, it
is unable to recontract with the investor.
3.1 The second stage decision problem for the host
The first stage agreement stipulates that the host receives T in present discounted
value of tax revenue, provided the host does nothing to diminish the investor’s pay-
off. In the second period, the host decides whether to regulate. The purpose of the
regulation might be to achieve an environmental objective that falls within the scope
of the police powers carve-out, or it might be a means of disguised expropriation.
The standard definition of expropriation in international law requires that
the host gain something from the allegedly expropriatory action. We define R as
the expected value of residual benefits, excluding compensation payments, to the
host from regulation. R is observable only to the host. In a traditional expropri-
ation case, R represents the value to the host of the plant or property taken from
the foreign investor. However, in the context of regulatory takings, it is a matter
of debate whether the host must directly benefit from an action before that action
can be labeled expropriation. Indeed, it is arguable whether any of the host gov-
ernments actually benefited directly from first allowing and then expropriating the
investments in the cases described in Section 2. The Glamis Gold case provides
9A multiperiod generalization of this model would allow the host to decide when to regulate.
Even in this case it would, in general, not be optimal for the host to wait until it had perfect informa-
tion about the environmental harm. Our model captures in a simple manner the idea that the host
sometimes wants to impose regulations even before it is certain about damages in the unregulated
state.
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probably the best example of government gain. One could argue that, through the
permitting process, U.S. governments at various levels sold to Glamis the right to
remove the gold from U.S. soil. Then the Californian backfilling regulations took
that right away. The end result was that the U.S. retained both the gold and the
money from the sale of the mining claims. In light of the uncertainty whether a host
must gain in order for an action to be deemed expropriation, we include R in our
model, but none of our results rely on R being positive. When R > T the host has
an incentive to expropriate, creating a hold-up problem. If instead R is small, there
is no holdup problem; however the lack of cost-internalization may still induce ex-
cessive regulation and therefore be globally inefficient.
In the interest of simplicity, we assume the investor loses the entire value of
the investment if regulated.10 The investor’s project cost, including the normal risk-
adjusted return, is K. Conditional on the host not regulating, the present discounted
value of the project in the second stage is a random variable with expected value pi .
The expected value to the investor of the unregulated project is pi−T . The value of
pi is learned in the second stage, and is not verifiable by the court, so the court cannot
use it to calculate compensation. The investor can run the project more efficiently
than the host (pi > R), so transfer of ownership is never efficient for society.
It is common knowledge that the investment might cause environmental
harm of magnitude H. After the investment has been made, the host learns β , the
probability that this harm will actually occur (0≤ β ≤ 1); β is private information,
and is uncorrelated with the stream of future profits, pi . After learning β , the host
takes one of the three actions described above.
If the host decides to regulate without paying compensation, the investor
files a complaint. The tribunal imposes a test to determine whether the regulation
falls within the scope of the police powers carve-out. Following the actual practice
of NAFTA tribunals, e.g. in Metalclad v. United Mexican States, we assume the
host must pay the investor compensation equal to K if the host fails the test. We
assume that pi −T −K > 0, i.e. the source’s expected net return conditional on pi
and no regulation is positive.
In our setting the host has an unobservable incentive to use bogus environ-
mental regulation as an indirect means of expropriation. The tribunal must use
public details of the case to determine whether the regulation falls within the scope
of the police powers carve-out, and is thus non-compensable. We assume that the
10Whether the regulation reduces to 0 or merely diminishes the value of the project to the investor
may be germane to the court’s decision. If this is the case, then the host may need to decide on
the form of regulation, not merely on whether to regulate. We ignore this kind of complication.
For example, the host may have a binary choice, e.g., whether to allow the citing of a hazardous
waste facility (as in Metalclad v. United Mexican States) or whether to allow the use of MTBE (as
in Methanex v. U.S.).
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tribunal’s likelihood of accepting the police powers carve-out defense is greater the
higher is β . That is, the stronger the private evidence of environmental risk, the
more likely that the public record and the tribunal acknowledge this risk. We also
assume that, for a given realization of β , the tribunal is less likely to rule in favor
of the host the more weakly the IIA defines the police powers carve-out (i.e the
more strongly the IIA defines expropriation protection). Let N measure the strength
of the protection from indirect expropriation; N is set exogenously by the terms of
the IIA and by the body of international law. A larger value of N corresponds to a
weaker police powers carve-out, i.e. a higher standard of proof the host must meet.
We formalize these concepts via the function P(β ,N), defined as the probability the
tribunal rules in favor of the host; the above assumptions imply ∂P/∂β > 0 while
∂P/∂N < 0.
In order to illustrate our main results concerning the efficient choice of N (in
the following section), we use closed form expressions for the slopes of indifference
curves. For this purpose, we adopt the specification11
P(β ,N) = exp(−(1−β )N) . (1)
The parameter N measures the strength of the indirect expropriation protection: for
N = 0 the host always wins arbitration, so there is no investor protection; as N→∞
the host never wins, except in the limiting case where the host is certain that the
project is harmful (β = 1).
The host always pays court costs C, which we take to be a constant. (Allow-
ing C to be a non-decreasing function of N leads to uninteresting complications.)
For simplicity, and to reflect the view that the variable legal costs are more onerous
for the host, we ignore the investor’s court costs.12
11We also studied a model with the following binomial structure. The tribunal accepts the police
powers carve-out defense if and only if the host’s regulation passes N independent and simultaneous
“trials”. For example, the tribunal will simultaneously review whether the regulation was properly
vetted with the scientific community, whether regulators were subject to undue influence from lobby
groups, whether the investor was kept abreast of the policy process, and so on. Each trial might
result in “pass” or “fail”, i.e. the regulation was properly vetted or not. Let p be the probability
that a trial results in pass when the project is harmful, and q ∈ (0, p) be the probability that the trial
results in pass when the project is not harmful. The host’s subjective probability that the project is
harmful is β , so its subjective probability of passing the test is P(β ,N) = β pN +(1−β )qN . This
alternative formulation leads to the same qualitative results as described in this section of the paper.
However, this alternative does not produce closed form expressions for the slopes of indifference
curves, needed for the following section.
12In practice, tribunals often make the loser pay everyone’s court costs, as in Methanex v. United
States. With this practice, there would be a fourth possible outcome to the second stage if the
investor observes β ; the investor would accept regulation without compensation whenever β >
1+
ln KK+C
N . Assuming that the loser pays C would change details of the second stage equilibrium, but
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We assume that K is greater than each of C and R. The inequality K > C
means that the host will litigate rather than voluntarily compensate the source if the
host is certain of victory (i.e. if P = 1). K > R implies the host would not make the
investment on its own, since the cost of the investment (K) exceeds the payoff of
the host-run investment (R).
3.2 The second stage outcome
The host’s and source’s expected payoffs under the three possible host actions (as-
sociated with the letters “a,b,c” respectively) are in Table 1:13
Table 1: 2nd stage expected payoffs and actions
Host’s Action Host’s exp. payoff Source’s exp. payoff
(a) do not regulate T −βH pi−T
(b) regulate & compensate R−K K
(c) regulate & litigate R− (1−P(β ,N))K−C (1−P(β ,N))K
Pair-wise comparison of host’s payoffs under the three actions in Table 1
generates three threshold values:
β1 ≡
N− ln KC
N
,
β2 = z−1(T ) where z(β )≡ R− (1−P(β ,N))K−C+βH,
β3 ≡ T +K−RH .
For example, when the realization of β is greater than threshold value β1, the host
will prefer to regulate and go to arbitration rather than to regulate and settle directly.
we have verified that there would be no qualitative changes in the first stage results. Accordingly,
we maintain the simpler assumption that the host pays C.
13FDI may also generate positive spillovers for the host above and beyond tax payments. Higher
employment and technology transfer are common examples. Adding a positive term to the host’s
payoff under action (a) would capture this feature.
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The value of T at which β1 = β2 = β3 is
T˜ ≡ H +R−K+ H
N
ln
C
K
. (2)
T˜ is a threshold tax level beyond which the host is unwilling to regulate and settle
directly. For a given realization of β , the higher is the tax level the greater the
host’s expected payoff from not regulating. Once T exceeds the threshold value T˜ ,
the host will never forgo its tax revenues in favor of regulation unless it also thinks
that the probability of harm is high enough to make defending its case before a
tribunal preferable to paying compensation outright.
The following proposition uses the above definitions to identify the host’s
optimal second stage actions contingent on the realization of β . (All proofs are in
Appendix A.)
Proposition 1 In the regulation stage (second period), the host’s optimal action
depends on the realization of β .
• If T ∈ [0, T˜ ) then β3 < β2 < β1 and the host will: regulate and litigate if
β > β1; regulate and directly compensate if β ∈ (β3,β1); not regulate if
β < β3.
• If T ≥ T˜ then β1 ≤ β2 ≤ β3 and the host will: regulate and litigate if β > β2;
not regulate if β < β2; never directly compensate.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships listed in Proposition 1 for the case T˜ >
0; the letter a, b, or c in each of the Figure’s regions identifies the host’s optimal
action, defined in Table 1. The graphs of β2 and β3 are increasing in T , while β1
is independent of T , and the three graphs intersect at the same point. T˜ > 0 if and
only if
N >
H
H +R−K ln
K
C
. (3)
Inequality (3) shows that the judicial test must be sufficiently strict in order for the
host to prefer paying compensation rather than litigating, given that it is optimal to
regulate.
Comparative statics of an increase in N For N sufficiently close to 0 (where β1
and T˜ are negative), the court almost always finds in favor of the host. In this case
the host regulates for all values of β whenever its tax revenue, T , is less than the
benefit of regulation minus the litigation costs, R−C. For large β this regulation
achieves an environmental goal, and for small β the regulation is merely disguised
15
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Figure 1: Second period Host actions, for constant N
expropriation. The absence of a strict burden of proof for the police powers carve-
out creates a hold-up problem at the investment stage, because the investor knows
that the host will have an incentive to expropriate at a later stage.
If T˜ > 0, as in Figure 1, an increase in N decreases the region (labelled “c”)
in (T,β ) space where the host decides to litigate; the increase in N expands both the
region in which the host decides to regulate and compensate (“b”), and the region
in which the host decides not to regulate (“a”).
For simplicity, we assume hereafter that the probability distribution for β
does not have a mass point at β = 1. With this assumption, the probability that the
host will litigate when N = ∞ is 0. As N becomes large, the host has negligible
chance of prevailing in court. As N → ∞, β1 → 1. In this limiting case, corre-
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sponding to no police powers carve-out, the host pays compensation if β > β3, and
otherwise refrains from regulating.
Social inefficiency There are two sources of inefficiency at this stage of the model.
The first is that the host sometimes litigates, incurring socially wasteful court costs
C. If this were the only source of inefficiency, it could be made negligible by
choosing N sufficiently large, so that the host never litigates.
However, even when N = ∞, inefficiency persists if the required compen-
sation, K, is less than the investor’s lost profits, pi − T . In this case, the host
does not fully compensate the investor, and therefore does not fully internalize the
cost of regulation; this is true even if R is zero. The host regulates if and only if
R−K > T − βH, i.e. when βH > T +K−R. In contrast, the socially efficient
program requires regulation if and only if joint welfare with regulation, R, exceeds
joint welfare without regulation, pi−βH. Regulation is efficient ex post if and only
if βH > pi −R. Provided that the host has positive expected profits (pi > T +K),
the socially optimal minimal value of β that triggers regulation is strictly higher
than the value of β above which the host regulates. In this sense, the host regulates
too often.
Second period equity For N sufficiently large, there are combinations of β and
T for which the host’s second-period expected payoff is negative. In these cases,
the host is worse off than if it had never accepted the project. Equity concerns
may make this kind of outcome unattractive. A smaller value of N (i.e., a stronger
police powers carve-out) would address these concerns.
4 The investment stage
During the first stage, the host and source determine the size of the tax payment T
and the investor decides whether to undertake the investment project. Depending
on the details of the IIA, the host may also be able to veto the project. In this stage,
actors take the breadth of the police powers carve-out as pre-determined. They
also take as given other clauses in the IIA, notably National Treatment and rules
granting right of establishment.
We examine the equity, efficiency, and investment implications of differ-
ent combinations of T and N. In particular, we show that IIAs with high N may
discourage investment or be inequitable and potentially inefficient. We begin by
calculating each agent’s first stage (ex ante) expected welfare conditional on the
project proceeding. We then turn to the equity and efficiency of an outcome. A
numerical example closes the section.
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4.1 Ex ante expected welfare
The channel through which the host extracts T from foreign investors merits further
discussion. If the IIA allows the host to demand side payments for access to its
market, then T would include the value of those payments, in addition to the present
value of future taxes. An IIA that contains a right of establishment clause prohibits
these side payments, making it more difficult for the host to extract rent from the
investor in the pre-investment stage. This limit on the host’s bargaining power
benefits the investor. The host might also benefit from this prohibition, because it
decreases the scope for bribing corrupt officials (Markusen, 2001).
We assume that the host is not able to demand a side payment as a condition
for investment. Thus, T consists only of revenues collected from foreign-owned
enterprizes during general taxation. This limitation is the key to our results. Na-
tional Treatment clauses stipulate that governments may not treat the investments
of foreigners less favorably than those of citizens. In terms of general profit taxes,
governments may not charge foreigners a higher tax rate. With this in mind, let td
define the host’s optimal domestic tax rate. If the tax rate t necessary to deliver T
from the potential project is less than td , then the National Treatment clause does
not prevent the host from obtaining T .14 However, if t > td the host cannot obtain
T without violating the National Treatment clause, unless it increases the domes-
tic tax rate above its optimal level. Standard tax considerations and the theory
of the excess burden of taxation explain why raising taxes above td imposes costs
on the host, regardless of whether the host eventually regulates the foreign-owned
project.15
We use a reduced form model of the excess burden from domestic taxa-
tion. We assume that domestic and foreign investment markets are independent,
and denote the deadweight loss from excessive taxation in the domestic market by
14National treatment standards in international investment agreements do not prevent hosts from
providing more favorable treatment to foreigners. A substantial literature addresses the potentially
harmful tax competition between countries trying to attract FDI (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003).
Concerns about such competition have led to criticism of the one-sided nature of national treatment
clauses in investment agreements (Panagariya, 1999).
15If the elasticities of supply of foreign and domestic investment differ, the host has an economic
reason for imposing different taxes on the two types of investment; there may also be positive exter-
nalities associated with domestic investment. In general, the optimal tax (from the standpoint of the
host) levied on domestic investment may be lower than the optimal tax levied on foreign investment.
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D(T ).16, 17 The amount of revenue generated by the tax rate td is denoted T d . By
definition of deadweight loss, D(T ) > 0 for T > T d . Thus the host’s benefit from
payment T is T −D(T ). A positive value of D(T ) implies a first stage inefficiency:
some of the rents transferred from the investor to the host are dissipated via tax dis-
tortions in the domestic investment market. The requirement of National Treatment
caps the payment T the host can extract from the source without paying a penalty
arising from distortions in its own market. This constraint may limit the ability of a
larger T to offset the risk associated with higher N, causing the first stage outcome
to be inefficient.18
We now describe the host and foreign investor’s ex ante expected welfare
as a function of (T,N). Both agents have rational expectations regarding the host’s
second-stage decision; they understand how this decision depends on (T,N) and
the realization of β . Both agents’ subjective probability distribution for β is uni-
form over [0,1]. The discount factor is set equal to one and we assume that pi is
independent of β .
Many investor-to-state disputes are settled even before arbitration is launched
(UNCTAD, 2005). We therefore restrict our analysis to the most interesting case,
where there are realizitions of β for which the host wants to take any of the three
possible second-stage actions. From equation (2), this possibility requires that
T < T˜ . We define an additional variable, T¯ ≡ 0.5(R+ pi)−K, whose role will
be apparent in Lemma 1 below. In the interest of brevity we restrict our attention
to taxes satisfying T ∈ (T¯ , T˜ ). This interval is independent of the deadweight loss
function D(T ). This fact is important because it means that there always exists a
function D(T ) for which the conditions in the lemmas and propositions below are
satisfied, so the results are not vacuous.
Table 1 above gives the host’s and source’s second period expected payoffs
conditional on the realization of β . Using the entries in that table, the ex ante
expected payoff, E(WH), for the host from accepting the project is
16The MFN principle might similarly generate deadweight loss. The host’s share of any such loss
can be incorporated into D(T ).
17The host can use T to reduce the need for domestic taxation, so in a full model of international
taxation, td and T are not independent. In order to keep the model simple, we ignore these kinds of
interactions.
18Note that our purpose is to examine the implications of National Treatment (NT) rules for
the efficiency of strict expropriation-compensation provisions. The fact that NT may render strict
expropriation provisions inefficient does not imply that NT rules are inefficient in their own right.
NT rules may be efficiency enhancing if, for example, the host has a tendency to overtax foreign
firms relative to domestic ones in the absence of any IIA.
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E(WH) =
∫ β3
0
(T −βH)dβ +
∫ β1
β3
(R−K)dβ
+
∫ 1
β1
(R− (1−P(β ,N))K−C)dβ −D(T ),
(4)
and the ex ante expected payoff, E(WS), for the source from investing K is
E(WS) =
∫ β3
0
(pi−T )dβ +
∫ β1
β3
Kdβ +
∫ 1
β1
(1−P(β ,N))Kdβ −K. (5)
4.2 Efficiency
In order to determine the shape of the respective indifference curves in (T,N) space,
we first collect the partial derivatives of E(WH) and E(WS), using the definition
α = 1+ lnK− lnC.
∂ (E(WH))
∂T
=
K+T −R
H
−D′ ∂ (E(WH))
∂N
=
αC−K
N2
∂ (E(WS))
∂T
=−(K−R+T )− (pi−K−T )
H
∂ (E(WS))
∂N
=
K−C
N2
(6)
Using these derivatives, the slope of the host’s indifference curve is
dN
dT
∣∣∣∣
dE(WH)=0
=
[
K−R+T −D′(T )H
K−αC
]
N2
H
, (7)
and the slope of the source’s indifference curve is
dN
dT
∣∣∣∣
dE(WS)=0
=
[
K−R+T − (pi−T −K)
K−C
]
N2
H
. (8)
The shape of the indifference curves depends on the following conditions.
C1. 0 < T < T˜
C2. D′(T )<
K+T −R
H
(9)
C3. T > T¯ whereT¯ ≡ R+pi
2
−K
C4. D′′(T )>
1
H
+
2N
K−αC
(
T +K−R
H
−D′(T )
)2
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Lemma 1 When conditions C1, C2, and C3 hold, both the host and the source’s
indifference curves are upward sloping in T,N space.
Conditions C2 and C3 should hold in any outcome. Condition C2 ensures
the marginal domestic distortion from T is not so large that it makes raising T
immediately harmful to the host. (Section 4.3 discuss problems arising when T
violates C2.) Condition C3 ensures that higher taxes do not benefit the source (by
reducing the risk of regulation). Under conditions C1-C3, each indifference curve
has a positive slope, and a north-west movement (in the T,N plane) increases the
source’s welfare and reduces the host’s welfare.
Next we consider the convexity of agents’ preferences.
Lemma 2 The source has convex preferences over T and N when conditions C1
and C3 hold. The host has convex preferences over T and N when conditions C1,
C2, and C4 hold.
Convexity of the host’s preferred set is equivalent to concavity of the host’s indif-
ference curve (N as a function of T ). Convexity of the host’s preferred set requires
that D′′ is sufficiently large.
Lemmas 1 and 2 are pivotal for understanding the efficiency of a weak ver-
sus strong police powers carve-out. We start with the case where D′ and D′′ are
negligible, i.e. where the host bears little if any cost when extracting payment T
from the source. Supporters of strong indirect expropriation protections likely have
this scenario in mind.
Proposition 2 If conditions C1, C2 and C3 hold, if pi −T −K ≥ 0, and if the tax
distortion is sufficiently small (i.e. D′≈D′′≈ 0), then, for any No,T o pair satisfying
T o ∈ (T¯ , T˜ ), there exists a Pareto superior pair N′,T ′ where N′ > No and T ′ > T o.
When D′′ ≈ 0, condition C4 is violated and the host’s preference set is not
convex. Moreover, equations (7) and (8) imply that for D′ ≈ 0 the host’s indif-
ference curve is steeper than the source’s. In this case, any outcome (T,N) with
T < T˜ and finite N is inefficient: the host and source would both benefit from a
weaker carve-out and a correspondingly larger transfer T to the host. Proposition
(2) assumes that T < T˜ . Appendix B shows that outcomes with finite N are also
inefficient when T ≥ T˜ if D′ ≈ 0. These results imply that a (vanishingly) weak
police powers carve-out is necessary for efficiency when D′ ≈ D′′ ≈ 0. That is,
when there is only negligible inefficiency at the investment stage, a police powers
carve-out is inefficient. In our model with symmetric first-stage information and
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risk neutral agents, this leaves only the second-stage inefficiencies—the hold-up
and cost-internalization problems—for which a strict rule regarding expropriation
and compensation is an appropriate solution.
Now we consider cases where tax distortion is non-negligible and a National
Treatment clause limits a host’s ability to obtain sufficient compensation for bearing
all the post-investment risk. In this case, N < ∞ is efficient, while a weak police
powers carve-out might limit investment or be inequitable and possibly inefficient.
In order to make the point simply, we continue to assume T < T˜ .19 We begin by
showing that the contract curve is vertical when conditions C1-C4 all hold.
Proposition 3 When conditions C1, C2, C3, and C4 hold, the host’s and source’s
indifference curves are tangent at a unique tax rate T ∗. The contract curve consists
of a vertical segment{
T,N : T = T ∗,N ∈
(
HlnKC
H +R−K−T ∗ ,
K−αC
2
[
D′′(T ∗)−1/H
T ∗+K−R
H −D′(T ∗)
])}
.
The proof contains the implicit equation that determines the value of T ∗. Proposi-
tion 3 provides sufficient conditions for tangency of the source’s and host’s indif-
ference curves at interior values of N. Importantly, pairs (T,N) along the resulting
contract curve are locally efficient. In short, when there is a non-trivial bargaining
inefficiency, a strong police powers carve-out can be locally efficient. Convexity of
the preference sets is guaranteed only for a subset of the relevant choice set, so we
cannot establish global efficiency.
The contract curve is a vertical segment at a unique transfer payment T ∗.
The uniqueness of T ∗ means it is not possible to raise the source’s welfare by raising
N and still compensate the host for bearing more of the ex post risk associated with
investment. Instead, a larger value of N (together with an efficient tax T ∗) represents
a transfer of welfare from the host to the investor. In this situation, the claim that
a strict interpretation of IIA expropriation clauses benefits investors at the expense
of host nations is correct. Moreover, as we show below, under some circumstances
IIAs with high Ns can also inhibit investment.
19Even though T is a choice variable, restricting its range is valid: certain parameter and func-
tional form restrictions imply T < T˜ in any sensible agreement. For example, if we restrict parameter
values such that D′(T˜ ) < 1 and D′′ ≥ 0, then for any T ≥ T˜ , ∂E(WH )∂T = β2−D′(T ) < 0. Since no
sensible contract will specify a transfer payment that hurts both the source and the host, contracts
with T ≥ T˜ will not be viable.
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4.3 Investment
In the second stage, after the investment has been sunk, the project might produce
negative expected benefits to either the host or the investor. In the first stage, the
investor has the option of walking away from the project, so the investor’s ex ante
expectation of its benefit from the project is non-negative in any first stage equilib-
rium. The host would like to reject projects that generate negative expected benefits,
but its ability to do so depends on the terms of the IIA.
To see how a weak police powers carve-out may reduce investment, consider
the case where the IIA and judicial interpretation lead to a weak police powers
carve-out (large N), a project is risky (large H), and the marginal deadweight loss,
D′ is large. In this situation the host requires a large compensation (T −D(T ))
in order to benefit from the project, i.e. in order that E(WH) ≥ 0. If the host is
able to reject projects, the weak police powers carve-out may result in the rejection
of (potentially) mutually beneficial projects. If the host cannot reject projects,
the weak police powers carve-out can lead to expected losses for the host and the
establishment of (potentially) globally inefficient projects.
For example, suppose that the source has all of the bargaining power, and the
host must receive expected welfare no less than that associated with the indifference
curve labeled W in Figure 2 (i.e. the host has some ability to reject projects). If the
source could choose both T and N, the outcome would be T ∗ and N∗ (where the
source’s indifference curve S∗ is tangent to the host’s participation constraint, W ).
However, if N is set exogenously at Nˆ > N∗, then the source needs to offer the host
Tˆ , the level that satisfies the host’s participation constraint. At Nˆ, Tˆ , the source
obtains a level of welfare given by the indifference curve Sˆ. If this welfare level is
below the source’s reservation level, the host and source will be unable to arrive at
a mutually beneficial agreement regarding the terms of investment.
Another possibility (not drawn) is that N is predetermined at a level N1 so
high that there is no value of T that can guarantee the host non-negative expected
welfare, so the host rejects the project. This is possible when condition C2 is vio-
lated, i.e. when the marginal tax distortion is so large that, at high T , it swamps any
direct expected benefits from the project.
Most IIAs provide only weak rights to invest and hosts are able to reject
unattractive projects. For these agreements, the greater regulatory risk caused by a
weak police powers carve-out might lead hosts to reject many projects, reducing the
equilibrium level of FDI. Some agreements — typically those to which the United
States is party such as NAFTA — are more complicated. Rights of establishment
and acquisition are included in the MFN and National Treatment clauses, making it
difficult for the host to reject risky investments. NAFTA hosts may have to accept
projects that they expect will not be beneficial for them. However, NAFTA signato-
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Figure 2: Host’s participation constraint (W ) and investor’s indifference curves (S).
ries had the option to exempt entire sectors from the MFN and National Treatment
clauses. To the extent that the signatories were able to anticipate (at the time of
signing) which sectors would be risky, they do not need to accept projects with neg-
ative expected benefits. However, exempting these sectors means that they enjoy
none of the positive effects of the agreement (increased security and transparency).
4.3.1 A numerical example
Here we provide a numerical example of the impact that a strict expropriation clause
may have in the context of an IIA with weak rights to invest: the project is rejected
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by the host when N is high, but accepted by both host and source when N is lowered
sufficiently.
Assume that D(T ) is quadratic: D(T ) = max{0,aT 2/2− bT}. We use the
following parameter values in our example: pi = 2, H = 1.5, C = 0.1, R = 0.8,
K = 1, a = 1, b = .1. Then D(T ), D′(T ) and D′′(T ) are positive whenever T > 0.2.
By equation (14) of Appendix A, T ∗ = 0.475, which is less than T˜ provided N >
4.189. Moreover, (K+T ∗−R)/H−D′(T ∗) = 0.075 while T¯ ≡ 0.5(R+pi)−K =
.4, rendering the host’s welfare increasing and the source’s welfare decreasing in
T at T = T ∗. The host’s preferences are convex at T ∗ for some N (using equation
(13) in the appendix); in particular, the host’s preference set is convex provided
N < 19.922. In sum, under the parameter values above, the host’s and source’s
indifference curves are tangent at T ∗ = 0.475 provided N ∈ (4.189,19.922). We
note that, because T ∗ < R, the holdup problem would be present in this example if
there were no compensation rule in place.
Finally, substituting values into (4) gives E(WH |T =T ∗)=−0.208+1.130/N
and setting this expression to 0 implies N∗ = 5.906. By (5), at (T ∗,N∗) the source’s
expected payoffs (net of up front costs K) equals 0.084. Thus, both the host and
the source are willing to undertake the project when (T,N) = (T ∗,N∗). Suppose
that, instead, the IIA pegs N at N1 = 7. At N1, there is no transfer that can ensure
the host non-negative expected welfare, and the host will reject the project outright.
Thus, in this example, a sufficiently high value of N hinders potentially mutually
beneficial investment.
5 Conclusion
Proponents of strong protections from indirect expropriation in IIAs claim that such
an interpretation promotes investment by helping to overcome the hold-up problem
and the tendency of governments not to internalize regulatory costs. Other com-
mentators, including numerous IIA arbitration tribunals, argue that governments
should be exempt from paying compensation for regulations that serve a legitimate
public purpose and that are non-discriminatory.
We used a simple model to analyze the efficiency and equity implications of
a police powers carve-out, given the presence of non-discrimination rules. A po-
lice powers carve-out creates two potential inefficiencies during the post-investment
(regulation) stage. First, when parties can dispute whether a regulation is legitimate,
a carve-out may encourage costly litigation. Second, a positive probability of a tri-
bunal exempting the regulator from paying compensation encourages the host to
regulate more often than is warranted from a joint welfare perspective. Both of
these inefficiencies stem from moral hazard. If these are the only inefficiencies in
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the investment game, then there is no role for a police powers carve-out. It is Pareto
efficient to adopt a strong protections from indirect expropriation, and use taxes
that are set prior to investment to compensate the host country for the increased
regulatory risk.
However most modern investment treaties also potentially generate ineffi-
ciency at the stage when the terms of the investment are determined.20 For example,
the National Treatment principle requires the host to treat foreign investors no less
favorably than domestic investors. A host government cannot demand side pay-
ments from foreign investors, nor can it charge them higher tax rates. This aspect
of National Treatment can create inefficiencies when the investment project is envi-
ronmentally risky. In order to be willing to accept a risky project while surrendering
the right to regulate the project without paying compensation, the host may need a
significant payment from the investor. The host may be unable to obtain this pay-
ment and still comply with the National Treatment clause, unless it imposes an
inefficiently high tax on domestic investment.
Distortions associated with non-discrimination clauses are central in our
analysis. We identified conditions under which this first stage inefficiency dom-
inates the moral hazard problems surrounding regulation. When the tax distortion
is sufficiently important, a range of police powers carve-outs are all Pareto-efficient.
Strong protections from indirect expropriation might simply transfer rent from the
host government to foreign investors.
We provided an example in which weakening the police powers carve-out
can reduce investment when signatories do not have a strong right of establishment.
Even in NAFTA (which does give a such a right) parties were able to select which
sectors to exempt from aspects of the treaty. When hosts can reject projects, in-
vestments must satisfy a participation constraint for both the host and the investor.
If the police powers carve-out to the expropriation clause is weak, the host requires
a large payment to accept risky projects. In some cases, there may be no outcome
that satisfies both parties’ participation constraints. In such a case, a stronger po-
lice powers carve-out would increase the range of mutually beneficial investment
opportunities. Stronger protections from indirect expropriation might inhibit rather
than encourage FDI.
20There may also be other sources of inefficiency which render a weak policy powers carve-
out less efficient. For example, when the size of the investment is endogenous, compensation for
regulatory takings can lead to over-investment (Blume et al., 1984, Aisbett et al., 2010).
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The relation i ≺ j means that action j gives the host a
higher payoff than action i. By Table 1, b ≺ c if and only if β > β1, where β1
solves the relation P(β1,N)K = C. Also by Table 1, a ≺ c if and only if β > β2
where β2 solves R−(1−P(β2,N))K−C = T −β2H. Similarly, a≺ b if and only if
β > β3, where β3 solves T −β3H = R−K. Finally, β1
{
>
≤
}
β2
{
>
≤
}
β3 if and
only if 1− ln
K
C
N
{
>
≤
}
T+K−R
H , which holds if and only if T
{
<
≥
}
T˜ . Provided
the probability distribution for β does not have a mass point at one of the critical
values, we do not need to specify which action the host will take when indifferent
between two options.
Proof of Lemma 1 When condition C1 holds, E(WH) and E(WS) are as given
by equations (4) and (5) and the corresponding partial derivatives are as given in
equations 6. Using values found in 6, we see that dE(WH)/dT > 0 if and only if C2
holds. The maintained assumption K >C implies that αC <K which in turn implies
that dE(WH)/dN is negative. Thus, conditional on C1, dNdT
∣∣
dE(WH)=0
is positive if
and only if C2 holds.
Condition C3 is necessary and sufficient for dE(WS)/dT > 0. Our main-
tained assumption K >C ensures that dE(WS)/dN > 0. Thus, given C1, dNdT
∣∣
dE(WS)=0
>
0 if and only if C3 holds.
Proof of Lemma 2 Condition C1 implies E(WH) and E(WS) are given by equa-
tions (4) and (5) respectively and the corresponding partial derivatives are as given
in 6. From 6, the cross partial derivatives of both welfare functions are 0, so the
functions are additively separable in T,N. For both agents, we can write expected
utility as G(T )+F(N). Of course, the functions are different for the two agents,
but to conserve notation we avoid subscripts. For the host, G′ > 0,F ′ < 0 and these
inequalities are reversed for the source. It is easy to show that the formula for the
second derivative of an indifference curve is
d2N
dT 2
=
(
−(F ′)2 G′′− (G′)2 F ′′) 1
(F ′)3
(10)
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Using equations 6, for the source, we have
G′ =−(K−R+T )− (pi−K−T )
H
G′′ =
d
(
− (K−R+T )−(pi−K−T )H
)
dT
=− 2
H
F ′ =
K−C
N2
F ′′ = 2
−K+C
N3
(11)
Given our maintained assumption that K > C, we see from 11 that for the source
F ′ > 0. Thus the cubic that multiplies the large parentheses in equation (10) is
positive, so the sign of d
2N
dT 2 is the same as the sign of
−
((
F ′
)2 G′′+ (G′)2 F ′′)
We can also see from 11 that F ′′ and G′′ are always negative. Since (G′)2 is always
positive, condition C1 is sufficient to ensure that d
2N
dT 2 > 0 for the source. As shown
in the proof of Lemma 1, given C1 holds, condition C3 is necessary and sufficient
to ensure that the source’s welfare is increasing as N becomes larger and T becomes
smaller. Thus the source’s preferred sets are convex when C1 and C3 hold.
The first and second derivatives of the host’s welfare are
G′ =
−R+K+T
H
−D′ G′′ = 1
H
−D′′
F ′ =
αC−K
N2
F ′′ =−2αC−K
N3
(12)
Since (for the host) F ′ < 0, the cubic that multiplies the large parentheses in equa-
tion (10) is negative. Thus the sign of d
2N
dT 2 is the same as the sign of
(F ′)2 G′′+(G′)2 F ′′ (13)
All the terms in equation (13) are always positive except for G′′. Thus d
2N
dT 2
is negative if and only if D′′ is sufficiently large, i.e. if condition C4 holds.
Convexity of the hosts preferences requires that either dNdT
∣∣
dE(WH)=0
> 0 and
d2N
dT 2 < 0 or
dN
dT
∣∣
dE(WH)=0
< 0 and d
2N
dT 2 > 0. Thus with reference to Lemma 1 we see
that convexity requires that either both C2 and C4 hold, or that neither hold.
Proof of Proposition 2 Condition C1 implies E(WH) and E(WS) are as given by
(4) and (5). By Lemma 1, the host’s and the source’s indifference curves slope
upward (N as a function of T ) when conditions C1-C3 hold. However, when D′ ≈
D′′ ≈ 0, the host’s indifference curve is convex (N as a function of T ) and, when
pi−T −K ≥ 0, is steeper than the source’s. In this situation, any No,T o satisfying
T ∈ (T¯ , T˜ ) can be improved upon by moving upward along one agent’s indifference
curve (holding that agent’s welfare constant) and increasing both T and N.
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Proof of Proposition 3 Condition C1 implies E(WH) and E(WS) are as given by
(4) and (5). When conditions C1-C4 hold, the indifference curves slope upward and
each agent’s preferred set is convex. Under these conditions, the contract curve is
the set of points in the T,N plane on which the indifference curves are tangent. The
slopes of both indifference curves are proportional to N2, implying that the contract
curve is independent of N; that is, the contract curve is vertical at the unique tax,
denoted T ∗, at which the slopes in equations (7) and (8) are equal to each other.
The equation for T ∗ is:
K−R+T ∗−D′(T ∗)H
K−αC =
K−R+T ∗− (pi−T ∗−K)
K−C . (14)
As noted above, points along the vertical line at T ∗ form the contract curve only if
preferences are convex. From Lemma 2, conditions C1, C2 and C4 jointly guaran-
tee a convex preferred set for the host. From 9 we see that condition C4 requires
N <
K−αC
2
[
D′′(T ∗)−1/H[T ∗+K−R
H −D′(T ∗)
]2
]
Finally,recalling equation (2), T ∗ < T˜ if and only if
N >
HlnKC
H +R−K−T ∗ .
Appendix B: Indifference curves when T ≥ T˜
When T ≥ T˜ then β3 ≥ β2 ≥ β1 and the host only undertakes two possible actions
in the second stage: (a) do not regulate, or (c) regulate and litigate. The host does
not regulate and compensate because the tax payment received in the absence of
regulation is too attractive to pass up unless there’s a high likelihood of winning in
court. When T ≥ T˜ , ex ante expected welfare for the host and source are given by
E(WH) =
∫ β2
0
[T −βH]dβ +
∫ 1
β2
[R− [1−P(β ;N)]K−C]dβ
and
E(WS) =
∫ β2
0
[pi−T ]dβ +
∫ 1
β2
K[1−P(β ;N)]dβ .
Differentiating and rearranging gives
dN
dT
∣∣∣∣
dE(WH)=0
=
β2−D′(T )
aK
and
dN
dT
∣∣∣∣
dE(WS)=0
=
β2− γ ∂β2∂T
ηK+ γ ∂β2∂N
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where η ≡ ∫ 1β2 P(β ;N)dβ > 0 and γ ≡ pi −T − [1−P(β2;N)]K. Since b > 0 is a
necessary condition for the source to invest, and ∂β2/∂T > 0, ∂β2/∂N > 0, then
whenever D′ ≈ 0, the host’s indifference curve is steeper than the source’s. Thus,
just as when T < T˜ as described in Proposition 2, if D′ ≈ 0, any contract (No,T o)
with No <∞ and T o ≥ T˜ can be improved upon by raising N and compensating the
host via correspondingly higher T .
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